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Abstract
The purpose of the National Airspace System Strategy Simulator is to provide the FAA with a
decision support system to evaluate long-term infrastructure and regulatory strategies. The NAS
strategy simulator consists of several modules representing the different entities within the NAS
embedded in a system dynamics framework. The MIT Airline Scheduling Module is the module
within the NAS Strategy Simulator that represents the decision making process of the airlines with
respect to the schedules that they fly.
The MIT Airline Scheduling Module is an incremental optimization tool to determine schedule
changes from one time step to another that best meets demand using available resources. The
optimization model combines an Integrated Schedule Design and Fleet Assignment model and a
model, based on Passenger Decision Window model, that determines passenger preference for
itineraries. We simultaneously establish frequency, departure times, fleet assignment, passenger
loads and revenue within a competitive environment.
Optimization methods often lead to extreme schedule decisions such as eliminating service to
markets, often small markets, that are not financially profitable for the airlines. This is of grave
concern to government policy makers as rural access to markets, goods and services is a politically
charged subject. The issue is to understand what is likely to happen in small communities if the
government doesn't respond in some way and how much subsidy, if any, would it be necessary to
encourage airlines to maintain service in these markets. The approach we will use is based on
economic policy and cost-benefit analysis.
Thesis Supervisor: John-Paul Clarke
Title: Associate Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics
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Chapter 1
Introduction
I MIT Airline Scheduling Module
The National Airspace System (NAS) Strategy Simulator is being developed by the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) to evaluate long-term infrastructure and regulatory strategies.
The NAS Strategy Simulator consists of several modules (representing the different entities
within the NAS) embedded in a system dynamics framework. The MIT Airline Scheduling
Module (ASM) is the module within the NAS Strategy Simulator that represents the decision
making process of the airlines with respect to the schedules that they fly.
The approach that is used in the MIT Airline Scheduling Module to generate the airline
schedule is driven by a simple observation: because the airline industry is characterized by
intense competition and a high cost structure, an airline must continuously adjust its
schedule and fleet assignment to minimize cost, meet passenger demand and thus maximize
its potential revenue. Therefore, airlines rely on advanced optimization techniques to
develop mission-critical decision support systems for management and control of airline
operations.
In this thesis, we present the details of an optimization model to generate a schedule that
maximizes the profit of the airline. This model simulates the fundamental airline decisions
that occur during the planning process.
II Airline Decision Making Process
11.1 Overview of the Airline Planning Process
The primary product of an airline is its flight schedule: a feasible plan of the cities and
corresponding times from/to which the airline will operate flights. Efforts to differentiate
this product from that of competitors include being first to introduce new aircraft types,
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increasing frequency of service, increasing the quality of in-flight catering and advertising
[Doganis, 1991].
The objective of minimizing costs and maximizing revenues is achieved through careful
planning. An overview of the airline planning process is shown in Figure 1-1. As shown in
the figure, the airline planning process has five major components: fleet planning, schedule
planning, revenue management, crew scheduling, and airport resource planning
[Lohatepanont, 2002]. These five steps may be explained as follows:
1. In the fleet planning step, the airline decides whether to purchase or lease new or used
aircraft and what type of aircraft should be bought or leased.
2. Schedule planning is defined as the design of system-wide flight patterns that provide
optimum public service, in both quantity and quality, consistent with the financial health
of the carrier [Wells, 1994].
3. Given a fleeted schedule, the purpose of revenue management is to maximize the
revenue subject to the seat capacity and the fare types. An ideal revenue management
system consists of two distinct but closely related components [Belobaba, 1987]:
differential pricing, and seat inventory control.
4. In crew scheduling, the objective is to find the minimum cost assignment of flight crews
(pilots and/or flight attendants) to flight legs subject to several restrictions, such as
maximum flying time or minimum rest time requirements.
5. Finally, airport resource planning deals with gate allocation, slot allocation (if applicable),
and ground personnel scheduling.
As is to be expected from the order in which they occur, fleet planning and schedule
planning are long-term strategic decisions that provide a basis for the airline business and are
typically revised only a couple of times a year. Revenue management, crew scheduling, and
airport resource planning are more tactical decisions, and made for immediate or short-term
application.
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Figure 1-1: An Overview of the Airline Planning Process
Schedule planning is one of the most vital and critical decision making steps in the airline
planning process. It consists of three major components: schedule design, fleet assignment,
and aircraft rotations. Most of the time, schedule planning starts from an existing schedule,
with a well developed route structure. Changes are then introduced to the current schedule
to reflect changing demands and/or changes in the operating environment.
The schedule design step is arguably the most complicated step of all and traditionally has
been decomposed into two sequential steps: frequency planning and timetable development.
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In frequency planning, one determines the appropriate service frequency in a market. In
timetable development, one places the proposed services throughout the day subject to
network considerations and other constraints.
The objective of fleet assignment is to assign the available aircraft to the flight leg in the
schedule such that the seating capacity on the aircraft closely matches the demand for the
flight to which an aircraft is assigned. Or, in other words, to minimize the number of
passengers that cannot be served because there are not enough seats on the aircraft.
The objective of the aircraft rotation step is to find a set of maintenance feasible rotations
for the available aircraft (a rotation is a sequence of connected flight legs flown by a single
aircraft that respects the maintenance rules of the airlines and regulatory agencies) given the
fleeted schedule and the available number of aircraft of each type [Lohatepanont, 2002].
11.2 Interaction between Supply and Demand
Traditionally, airline schedule planning is performed under the assumption that total demand
is known and is fixed regardless of changes in the schedules. However, the relationship
between supply and demand is non-linear and depends on numerous interrelated parameters.
Thus, it is difficult to evaluate the impact of one scheduling decision much less determine
the right decision.
The Integrated Schedule Design and Fleet Assignment Model, or ISD-FAM [Lohatepanont,
2002], captures the interaction between demand and supply in that it takes into account the
following situation: if a flight was not profitable because passengers did not choose it when
selecting their itinerary and it thus turned out that the operating costs were higher than the
revenue generated, then the airline's interest is best served by taking this flight out of its
schedule. However, the airline's interest is also served by adding more flights in promising
markets to increase service frequency and capture more market share. Therefore, the goal is
to determine the flights that the airline should take out and the flights that it should add.
The Extended Schedule Design and Fleet Assignment Model, or ESD-FAM [Lohatepanont,
2002], went a step further by simultaneously updating market shares as changes are made to
the schedule.
18
11.3 Competitive Environment
However there is a limitation to the ESD-FAM: while market shares are updated as changes
are made to the schedule of one airline, it is assumed that the schedules of its competitors
are fixed. Obviously this does not correspond to what happens in reality since airlines are
continuously and simultaneously modifying their schedule.
Understanding and simulating the competitive environment within which the airline is
operating is thus a major difficulty in airline's decision making. This competitive
environment heavily affects the airline's ability to attract significant market shares. Indeed,
when an airline decides to change its schedule either by adding or taking out a flight or by up
increasing or decreasing capacity on a flight leg, it changes the total supply distribution and
therefore affects the demand distribution among all the airline competitors. Consequently,
the competitive environment within which the airline is operating should be key to any
schedule design decision.
III Focus of the Thesis
111.1 Combining Existing Models
The MIT Airline Scheduling Module developed in this thesis integrates two complementary
approaches regarding the airline industry that have so far been studied separately: Airline
Schedule Planning and Airline Passenger Choice Theory.
Airline Schedule Planning is the generation of the schedule that maximizes the airline's profit
given assumed passenger preferences. In other words, the input is the exact number of
passengers that will effectively travel on a flight leg or an itinerary if the latter happens to be
scheduled by the airline given capacity constraint. In this case, the demand data are thus
considered as fixed and the output is the schedule and the corresponding fleet assignment
solution.
Airline Passenger Choice Theory models passenger preference for a given schedule.
Contrary to Airline Schedule Planning, Airline Passenger Choice Theory takes a fleeted
schedule as input and determines the passenger flow over the network given capacity
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constraint. In this case, the schedule is fixed beforehand and the output is the load for each
scheduled flight.
The ASM developed in this thesis has been designed to take both approaches into account
and thus bring the integration of the airline scheduling process a step further by coupling
two different models:
" The Extended Airline Schedule Design and Fleet Assignment Model or ESD-FAM,
which simultaneous solves the schedule generation problem and the fleet assignment
problem, and
" The Decision Window Model or DWM, which simulates Airline Passenger Choice.
Instead of forecasting how many passengers the airline will capture given its fixed schedule
and then computing the airline's profit, we want to design the airline's schedule so as to
maximize the airline's profit.
111.2 Using a Recursive Approach
As previously underlined, understanding and simulating the competitive environment within
which the airline is operating is critical to the airline's decision-making. The approach
presented in this thesis is from the point of view of an airline that is aware of the particular
competitive environment in which it is doing business and that is thus seeking a
methodology to make rational decisions about its own schedule for the next time period.
The resulting ASM model is thus based on an iterative process. The idea is that combining
both Airline Schedule Design and Airline Passenger Choice Theory within a recursive
process will improve the airline's abilities, when it is designing its schedule, to model the
processes that occur in real life.
Given the aircraft availability of the airline in the future (possible scenarios: acquisition,
retirement, no change) and a pre-specified list of candidate flight departures, the ASM Model
is an automated tool, which designs the schedule for the next time period that will attract the
most passengers and maximize profit by maximizing revenues while minimizing operating
costs.
20
111.3 Access for Small Markets
That being said, if schedule decisions are purely driven by optimization methods, service to
small markets may often be eliminated. This is of grave concern to government policy
makers as rural access to markets, goods and services is a politically charged subject.
Indeed, when the Airline Deregulation Act passed in 1978 in the USA and gave airlines
almost total freedom to determine which markets to serve domestically and what fares to
charge for that service, the Essential Air Service (EAS) program was put into place to
guarantee that small communities that were served by certificated air carriers before
deregulation maintain a minimal level of scheduled air service. The U.S. Department of
Transportation currently subsidizes commuter airlines to serve approximately 100 rural
communities across the country that otherwise would not receive any scheduled air service.
In other words, deregulation has a positive effect for the airline industry and, more generally,
for the travelers. However, it creates some significant challenges, which must be tackled if
the country wants to continue to enjoy these benefits in the future. One of the key issues is
the need to ensure that small regional markets receive the best possible service.
IV Thesis Outline
The outline of this thesis is as follows. In chapter 2, we review some existing models and
detail their respective contributions and limitations. In part A of chapter 2, we present the
Extended Airline Schedule Design and Fleet Assignment Model, which generates the
airline's schedule given the demand. In part B of chapter 2, we present two models that
allocate the demand given the airline's schedule: the Frequency Share - Market Share Model
and the Decision Window Model. In chapter 3, we present our MIT Airline Scheduling
Module, which combines the models developed in chapter 2, and detail our solution
approach. A case study and examination of the potential benefits of our integrated model
and solution approaches are presented in chapter 4. In chapter 5, we broaden the discussion
by investigating policy issues of access for small markets. Finally, in chapter 6, we conclude
with recommendations and possibilities for future research directions.
21
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Chapter 2
Overview of Existing Models
Part A: Modeling Airline Schedule Design Given
Demand
Extended Schedule Design and Fleet Assignment
Model (ESD-FAM)
The Extended Schedule Design and Fleet Assignment Model (ESD-FAM) was developed by
Manoj Lohatepanont in 2002.
I Notations
For convenience and reference, we list all notations for sets, decision variables, and
parameters in this section.
1.1 Sets
P: The set of itineraries in a market indexed by p or r.
PO: The set of optional itineraries indexed by q.
A: The set of airports, or stations, indexed by o.
L: The set of flight legs in the flight schedule indexed by I.
LF: The set of mandatory flights indexed by i.
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LO: The set of optional flights indexed by i.
K: The set of different fleet types indexed by k.
T: The sorted set of all event (departure or availability) times at all airports, indexed by .
The event at time tj occurs before the event at time i+ 1. Suppose I T =m; therefore t1
is the time associated with the first event after the count time and tm is the time
associated with the last event before the next count time.
N: The set of nodes in the timeline network indexed by {ko,#}.
CL(k): The set of flight legs that pass the count time when flown by fleet type k.
I(k,o, t): The set of inbound flight legs to node {ko,/}.
O(k,o, t): The set of outbound flight legs to node {k,o,#}.
L(q): The set of flight legs in itinerary q.
1.2 Decision Variables
t : The number of passengers requesting itinerary p but the airline attempts to redirect to
itinerary r.
fkj: =1 if flight leg i e N is assigned to fleet type k e K;
=0 otherwise.
Zq: =1 if itinerary q e PO is selected;
=0 otherwise.
= (1 - Zq): =0 if itinerary q e P0 is selected;
-1 otherwise.
ykot : The number of fleet type k e K aircraft that are on the ground at airport
0 e A immediately after time t e T.
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yk or: The number of fleet type k e K aircraft that are on the ground at airport
o e A immediately before time t, e T. If tl and t2 are the times associated with adjacent
events, then ykl = .
1.3 Parameters/Data
CAli : The number of seats available on flight leg i (assuming fleeted schedule).
SEA TSk : The number of seats available on aircraft of fleet type k e K.
Nk: The number of aircraft in fleet type k, Vk e K.
Nq: The number of flight legs in itinerary q.
D,: The unconstrained demand for itinerary p; i.e., the number of passengers requesting
itineraryp.
Qi : The unconstrained demand on leg i when all itineraries are flown.
fare,: The fare for itineraryp.
b : Recapture rate from p to r, the fraction of passengers spilled from itinerary p that the
airline succeeds in redirecting to itinerary r.
g': =1 if itinerary p e P includes flight leg i e N;
=0 otherwise.
ADP: Demand correction term for itinerary p as a result of canceling itinerary q.
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11 ESD-FAM Methodology
11.1 Incremental Changes
As stated earlier, the traditional approach to schedule development is sequential; it consists
of three steps: schedule design, fleet assignment, and aircraft rotation. In the ESD-FAM
approach, market service frequency, departure times (given a pre-specified list of candidate
flight departures), and fleet assignments are all determined simultaneously.
The ESD-FAM assumes that the schedule is daily (the same set of flights are flown every
day) and uses an incremental approach to schedule design. In other words, instead of
building a schedule from scratch, the ESD-FAM takes a base schedule (the daily schedule at
the current time period) as input and makes some changes to it (add new flight leg, remove
current flight leg) so as to generate the schedule for the next time period. It is in agreement
with industry practice and therefore reasonable to assume that the new schedule will be
based on the current schedule to which a number of modifications are introduced.
More specifically, the ESD-FAM takes two sets of flight legs as inputs: (1) mandatory flights,
and (2) optional flights; the potential modifications in the schedule would only affect the set
of optional flight legs. Note that the flight legs flown in the current schedule may be in
either of these two sets. The set of optional flights may include flight legs that have not
been flown so far. The set of mandatory flights do not include any flight leg that has not
been flown so far because the decision whether this flight leg should be flown is precisely
what the model should determine. However, it is theoretically possible to include flight legs
that have not been flown so far in the set of mandatory flights if necessary.
11.2 Passenger Flow Adjustment
The ESD-FAM uses two mechanisms to adjust passenger flows:
1. Demand correction terms, and
2. Recapture rates.
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With demand correction terms, the ESD-FAM aims at capturing demand and supply
interactions by adjusting the unconstrained demand on alternate itineraries p e P in a market
m when an optional itinerary q e P0 ,(p # q) is removed using demand correction terms
ADP's. The total unconstrained demand (market share) of the airline in a market m isq
therefore altered by Dq + 2 ADq (1 - Zq).
peP, peq
With recapture rates, the ESD-FAM simulates the reallocations on alternate itineraries
r e P in market m of passengers who would have liked to travel on an itinerary p E P when
this itinerary p is capacitated, using the recapture rates b 's. This does not affect the total
unconstrained demand (market share) of the airline in market m.
III ESD-FAM Objective Function
The objective of the ESD-FAM is to maximize schedule contribution, defined as revenue
generated less operating cost incurred.
The operating cost of a schedule (0) can be computed as follows, once fleet-flight
assignments are determined:
o = k ZcifkI
kEK ieL
The total revenue of a schedule can be computed from the following components:
1. Initial unconstrained revenue (R):
R = ZfareDP
reP
2. Lost revenue due to spill (S):
S = Zfarept
pEP reP
3. Recaptured revenue from recapturing spilled passengers (M):
M = bfare t
peP reP
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4. Changes in unconstrained revenue due to market share changes because of flight leg
addition or deletion (AR):
AR = Z rfareD, - Z farepADqP)
qeP pEP,ptq
The contribution maximizing objective function of the ESD-FAM is therefore:
Max R-AR-S+M-O
An equivalent cost minimizing objective function can be obtained by ignoring the constant
initial unconstrained revenue (R), which was computed for the schedule with all optional
flights flown, and reversing the signs of all other elements:
Min 0+(S-M)+AR
IV ESD-FAM Formulation
The formulation for the Extended Schedule Design and Fleet Assignment Model is the
following:
Min 1Z ckf + Z farp-bfare,.t;+ ( fareqDq- I fareAD'P (1-Zq)
keK ieL peP reP qePO peP,pqf
Subject to:
Z fk, i=1 ViE LF
keK
fk,< Vi eL
keK
Ykot + fk, -Yk,,t+ Z ki = Vk,o,t
ele(k at) iEO(k, t)
Yk,o, , k,i!Nk VkeK
oeO ieCL(k)
k,iSE ATSk +( Z i'- Z gy i&Q ieL-Z gP5ADqP(1-Zq)+ ZfkS ~Q ic
peP qeP keK rEP PEP reP peP
-J ADqp(-Z7) + t' <D, VP E P
qeP0  reP
Zq - fk. 0 Vi E L(q)
keK
Zq- Z fk, -Nq VqePo
ieL(q) kEK
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
28
f4 E{0,1} VkE K, Vi E L
ZqE {0,1} Vqe-P
Yk,o,t 0 V{k, o, t} E N
t > 0 Vp, re P
The 1" set of constraints is the set of cover constraints for mandatory flights ensuring that
every mandatory flight is assigned to a fleet type. The 2 "d set of constraints is the set of
cover constraints for optional flights allowing the model to choose whether or not to fly
flight i in the resulting schedule; if flight i is selected, a fleet type has to be assigned to it.
The 3 rd set of constraints ensures the conservation of aircraft flow.
The 4 th set of constraints is the set of count constraints ensuring that only available aircraft
are used.
The 5f set of constraints is the set of capacity constraints ensuring that the number of
passengers on each flight i does not exceed its capacity. The term E q qADqP(1-Zq)
p~ePsP
represents corrected demand at flight level when optional itineraries q e P0 are deleted.
The 6 th set of constraints is the set of demand constraints ensuring that the model does not
spill more passengers than demand for the itinerary. The term E ADq (1 - Zq) corrects the
qeP 0
unconstrained demand for itinerary p e P when optional itineraries q e P0 are deleted.
The 7 th and 8' set of constraints are itinerary status constraints that control the {0,1}
variable, Zq, for itinerary q. Specifically, the 7 th set of constraints ensures that Zq takes on
value 0 if at least one leg q is not flown and the 8th set of constraints ensures that Zq takes on
value 1 if all legs in q are flown.
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V Conclusion
The ESD-FAM model has two interesting features. First of all, the ESD-FAM approach
simultaneously determines market service frequency, departure times (given a pre-specified
list of candidate flight departures), and fleet assignment. Secondly, the ESD-FAM approach
uses demand correction terms to alter the total unconstrained demand (market share) of the
airline in market m when schedule changes (add/remove) are made to itineraries serving this
market.
One way to enhance the ESD-FAM model would be to establish a mechanism to modify the
demand for a market m when the service frequency of this market changes. By doing so, the
supply-demand interactions and the competitive environment would be considered during
the schedule design process to determine the profit-maximizing schedule that satisfies
fleeting constraints.
The ESD-FAM does not provide a way to simulate the importance of fares since fares are
only used as parameters when computing the unconstrained revenue and the revenue lost or
gained when optional flights are deleted or added. A way to improve further the model
would thus be to incorporate the effects of fares by linking the profit maximizing objective
function of the ESD-FAM and a revenue management model.
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Part B: Modeling Demand Allocation Given
Airline Schedule
Frequency Share - Market Share Model
I Objective of the Frequency Share - Market
Share Model
One of the simplest and most commonly used way to describe the airline competitive
environment is to determine market share as a function of frequency share in an isolated
O&D market. These models are Frequency Share - Market Share Models (FS-MS).
1.1 Basic S-curve Model
The relationship between frequency share and market share is not linear. For a given
competitor i, MS1 , the market share of total passenger demand for airline 4, is a function of
Freqj, the two-way frequencies for airline i and all its competitorsj (Eq. 1). The coefficient
a is an exponent representing the advantage of carriers with higher frequency shares. It
typically has values between 1 and 2.
MS, = Freq' (Eq. 1)( Freq'
This model is based on the assessment that if an airline increases its service frequency, it will,
as a result, capture more passengers. The relationship between frequency share and market
share is represented by a curve with a S-shape (as shown in figure 2-1), hence very often
referred to as the S-curve model.
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Figure 2-1: S-curve Model
1.2 Extended Frequency Share - Market Share Model
The basic FS-MS model has been extended [Melconian and Clarke, 2001] to include through
and connecting flights by modifying the meaning of Freq to include not only nonstop
flights, but a weighted sum of all available flights (Eq. 2). The extended model includes a
term for flights with one stop and flights with one connection; flights with more than one
stop, more than one connection, or both a stop and a connection are not included in the
model.
Freq = Freq, + b.Freq +c.Freq_ (Eq. 2)
The parameter b is the value of one-stop flights, and the parameter c is the value of one-
connection flights. These are fractions of the value of a non-stop flight, and should in all
cases be between 0 and 1. The results are presented in the following table (Table 1).
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Parameter
a 1.107
b 0.233
c 0.048
Table 2-1: Nonlinear Fit Results (ocf1)
II Features and Limitations of the FS-MS Model
The Frequency Share - Market Share Model represents the correlation between Frequency
Share and Market Share. The higher the frequency, the higher the market share. Moreover,
the relationship is not linear: an airline with a low frequency share that increases its service
frequency by one (everything else remaining unchanged) will capture more extra market
share than an airline with a high frequency share that increases its service frequency by one
(everything else remaining unchanged).
The strength of the model is its simplicity. However, there are three assumptions that limit
its utility: (1) the total market demand is fixed, (2) fares are not used as decision factors, and
(3) the demand for travel does not depend on the time-of-day.
11.1 Total Market Demand Is Fixed
In Frequency Share - Market Share Models, it is implicitly assumed that the total demand for
every single market is fixed no matter how high the total aggregated frequency over all the
airlines offering service is. In other words, when service frequencies vary, the passengers are
simply being redistributed among all the airlines offering service whereas the total number of
passengers served over all the airlines remains unchanged. Moreover, if an airline is already
attracting 100% of the market, the airline is not going to generate more travelers (e.g.
travelers diverted from other modes) by increasing its frequency.
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11.2 Fares
Frequency Share - Market Share Models do not have mechanism to account for the impact
of fares on a traveler's choice of itineraries. However, for some passengers, there is a real
trade-off between fare and itinerary quality: for example, one may be willing to fly a
connecting itinerary to get a fare that is $100 cheaper. Thus, the models are unable to react
when airlines use fares as a means to attract market share without making any change to the
schedule they offer.
11.3 Timing and Time-of-Day Demand Distribution
Frequency Share - Market Share Models do not have a mechanism to account for the
demand for travel as a function of the time-of-day. Indeed, when traveling from BOS to
SFO, more people want to depart at 12:30pm rather than at 11pm. Therefore, if two airlines
Al and A2 are competing in the BOS-SFO market and if Al is offering two itineraries, one
leaving at 12:30pm and one leaving at 11pm, while A2 is offering only one itinerary that
leaves at 12:30pm, a Frequency Share - Market Share Model would say that Al captures two
thirds of the market. However, when booking their trip and thus considering the different
departure times, one can argue that more than a third of the travelers will decide to travel
with airline A2 if A2 offers enough seats. Timing is therefore a determining factor in the
market share that is captured by an airline.
11.4 Conclusion
The extended Frequency Share - Market Share Model, which is the most developed model
among the Frequency Share - Market Share Models, is designed based on the assumption
that frequency and itinerary quality are the only determining factors; fares and timing are not
included in the model. Indeed the extended Frequency Share - Market Share Model remains
quite basic and has been presented here as a precedent to the Decision Window Model.
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Decision Window Model
I Objective of the Decision Window Model
The Decision Window Model (DWM) offers a partial solution to the challenge continually
faced by an airline and more specifically by its revenue management department. The DWM
is a tool that, given an airline schedule, predicts how many travelers will want to take each of
the itineraries offered.
It is based on the concept of a decision window, or the time window over which an individual
traveler decides between competing itineraries. This concept builds upon the assumption
that travelers base their decision process on time characteristics (day departure time, duration
of airline flights and arrival time). Itinerary quality, service quality and airline preference
influence the decision making process as well and are consequently incorporated into the
DWM.
The Decision Window Model has three steps.
" Step 1: Define the individual traveler's decision window
" Size of the window
" Position of the window
" Step 2: Determine which itineraries/paths to consider
" Itineraries in the window
" Eliminate itineraries with non-competitive characteristics
" Step 3: Determine which itineraries is first choice preference
* Trade-off between airline preference and itinerary quality
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11 Definition of a Decision Window
11.1 Paths/Itineraries
Paths, or itineraries, are flights and combinations of flights that will take a traveler from the
point of origin to their final destination.
Paths/itineraries can be of four different types: non-stop, one-stop, connecting and interline
connecting (when the two flight legs are flown by two different airlines).
11.2 Decision Window
As Boeing has defined it, the decision window represents the time frame within which the
traveler is willing to consider traveling. The decision window is bounded by the earliest
departure time and the latest arrival time the traveler will consider.
A decision window has three main characteristics. (1) It is typically situated on the preferred
day. (2) The window is wider than the perceived itinerary time. (3) Finally all departure and
arrival times within the window are satisfactory to the traveler.
There are two parameters to be determined when defining the individual traveler's decision
window:
1. Size/Width of the window: The decision window is the sum of the Delta-T and the
Schedule Tolerance (See definitions below).
2. Position of the window:
" What day is the Decision Window located in? Demand is allocated to days
based on the day-of-week demand distribution for the market considered.
" At what hour in the day is the Decision Window positioned? Demand varies
by hour, based on time-of-daj demand.
11.3 Delta-T (or AT)
Delta-T (or AT) is the difference between the local arrival time and the local departure time.
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The Delta-T of an itinerary is computed for a specific itinerary. For example, the Delta-T
for a non-stop flight leaving BOS at 9:30 AM and arriving at SFO at 12:51 PM is 3 hours
and 21 minutes.
The Delta-T of a market is the traveler's perception of the travel time in a given market; it is
usually equal to the Delta-T of the itinerary corresponding to the best service in the market
(smallest Delta-T in the market).
For itineraries and markets with time zone changes, Delta-T is different from the actual
travel time. Indeed, in the above example, BOS-SFO has a Delta-T of 3 hours and 21
minutes whereas the total travel time is 6 hours and 21 minutes.
11.4 Schedule Tolerance
The schedule tolerance represents the amount of time flexibility a traveler has in planning a
trip. As a matter of fact, even if a flight lasts 2 hours, a traveler may consider flights that
leave after 8pm and arrive before noon.
There are multiple schedule tolerances for individuals within a given market. The
distribution of schedule tolerances has been developed from survey results.
The decision window is the sum of the Delta-T and the schedule tolerance, as shown in
figure 2-2. For example, for a traveler in BOS-SFO market (AT=3h21), the earliest
departure is 7:00AM and the latest arrival is 12:00PM. The decision window size is 5 hours
and the schedule tolerance is 1 hour and 39 minutes.
Some people have a lot of schedule flexibility, while others have very little. The distribution
of all the individual decision windows within a market determines how many passengers find
each itinerary satisfactory.
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Figure 2-2: Decision Window Definition
11.5 Coverage State
The Coverage State is a representation of which itineraries fall within passenger decision
windows. For a given market and the set of itineraries associated with it, several coverage
states can be computed for each combination of itineraries.
For example, in a market served by the itineraries I1, 12 and 13, there are eight different
coverage states to be computed: (1) I1, 12 and 13 fall within the decision window, (2) I1, 12
and 13 don't fall within the decision window, (3) I1 and 12 both fall within the decision
window but 13 doesn't, etc.
The results are the percentage of people in the market who have a particular set of itineraries
within their window.
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For example, when the coverage state for (1) is 10%, it means that 10% of the people in the
market have all three itineraries within their decision window.
III Determination of Which Subset of Itineraries
in a Schedule the Traveler Will Consider When
Making a Decision
111.1 Which Itineraries Are Considered to Be in the
Traveler's Decision Window?
Given an individual decision window, there are two important rules to determine which
itinerary fits in it.
1. In the Decision Window Model, only itineraries that fit completely in the decision
window are considered for a traveler's first choice itinerary preference.
2. In the Decision Window Model, only the best service for each airline is considered
for the first choice itinerary preference. While itinerary quality is a dominant
characteristic, it is only dominant within an airline.
Figure 2-3: Which Itineraries Are Considered?
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111.2 What Are the Possible Scenarii?
Each traveler chooses among the itineraries offered by the airlines based on her individual
decision window. There are three possible scenarii:
1. If there are no itineraries within the window, the traveler must re-plan the trip.
2. If there is only one itinerary within the window, the traveler chooses that itinerary.
3. If there are multiple itineraries within the window, the traveler must make a choice
between the itineraries.
111.3 How Does Re-Planning Occur?
If a traveler cannot find a flight within her decision window he must re-plan her trip. Some
people re-plan by considering other flights on the same day. Other travelers look at the
same time-of-day period but on different days; they are referred to as day-of-week flexible
travelers.
Timing is crucial. Indeed itineraries beginning at popular times will be within more travelers'
decision windows.
IV Determination of the First Choice Preference
Itinerary
Considering a traveler's decision window, if there is only one itinerary within this window,
the traveler chooses that itinerary. However, when determining preference between multiple
itineraries within her window, a traveler faces a tradeoff between airline preference and
itinerary quality.
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IV.1 Tradeoff Between Airline Preference and Itinerary
Quality
IV.1.1 Decision Orientation
Different travelers evaluate itineraries differently: schedule oriented people are more
concerned with the schedule aspects of the flight whereas airline oriented people are more
concerned about airline image when choosing itineraries. As shown in figure 2-4 below,
decision orientation (schedule vs. airline oriented) varies by range of the trip measured in
miles: the longer the travel distance, the higher the percentage of people who are airline
oriented; the shorter the travel distance, the higher the percentage of people who are
schedule oriented. Therefore the trade-off between airline image and itinerary quality varies
with market.
Schedule oriented passengers look first for the best itinerary quality. They consider only
itineraries with the highest itinerary quality in the market, such as non-stops. If there are
multiple non-stops, then they consider airline.
Airline oriented passengers choose first the preferred airline, and then choose the best
itinerary for that airline.
Figure 2-4: Airline vs. Schedule Oriented Passengers
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IV.1.2 Measure of Airline Integrated Image
Travelers evaluate airlines based on a number of factors. The Decision Window Model
groups these factors into four areas.
1. Availability and Reliability, such as:
* Number of cities served
" Number of flights
" On-time performance
2. Marketing Programs, such as:
" Frequent flyer plan
* Discount fare plan
* Advertising
3. Service Quality, such as:
" Reservation services
" Pre-flight service
" In-flight service
" Food and beverage service
* Baggage service
4. Passenger Environment, such as:
* Seat comfort
* Cabin spaciousness/decor
* Flight cabin quietness
* Carry-on storage
* Types of airplanes flown
The four factors vary in importance depending on the range of the trip.
1. The importance of Availability and Reliability decreases when the range increases.
2. The importance of Marketing Programs is constant.
3. The importance of Service Quality increases when the range increases.
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4. The importance of Passenger Environment increases when the range increases.
The combination of these four areas forms a single image that a traveler has of a particular
airline, which is called the airline integrated image.
IV.1.3 Determination of Itinerary Quality
Itinerary quality is measured by the number of stops and connects on an itinerary. The best
itinerary quality is non-stop service, and has an Itinerary Quality Index of 1.
As shown in table 2-2, itinerary quality is decreased by: Stops, connects, interline connects,
other (excess time...). The indexes are used to discriminate low quality itinerary from high
quality itinerary.
Route Itinerary Quality Index
Non-stop 1
One-stop 2
One-connect 3
Interline Connect 4
Table 2-2: Itinerary Quality Index
IV.1.4 Airline Service Based Coefficients
The Airline Service Based Coefficients represent the result of the trade-off between airline
image and itinerary quality. Both airline and schedule oriented people are represented in the
coefficient. The table 2-3 demonstrates how the importance of the itinerary quality index
decreases as the range increases. Indeed, for a range equal to 1000 miles, the Airline Service
Based Coefficient varies from 100 to 0.14 when the itinerary quality index increases from 1
to 5. On the other hand, for a range equal to 6000 miles, the Airline Service Based
Coefficient varies from 100 to only 59.23 when the itinerary quality index increases from 1 to
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5. In other words, the longer the range, the smaller the difference between the Airline
Service Based Coefficients of a good itinerary quality index (1) and a bad one (5).
Airline Service Based Coefficients
Range (S. Mi.)
Itinerary Quality Index
1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000
1 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
2 19.45 33.86 49.82 65.28 78.28 87.73
3 3.78 11.46 24.82 42.62 61.28 76.96
4 .74 3.88 12.36 27.82 47.97 67.52
5 .14 1.31 6.16 18.16 37.55 59.23
Table 2-3: Airline Service Based Coefficients
IV.2 Determination of the First Choice Preference
Itinerary
We will assume from now on that travelers appreciate equally all the airlines that are offering
service. Consequently, the determination of the first choice preference itinerary is mainly
based on itinerary quality.
However, the Decision Window Model is designed such that, within a window, path choice
is determined after airline choice. This has important consequences on the probability that a
given flight is selected. For example: a traveler is faced with a choice between three nonstop
flights; he prefers airline Al and airline A2 equally and is indifferent to the three flights in
her window. This effect is shown graphically in figure 2-5. As shown in the figure, since the
market share equation is between airlines, Al gets half of the demand but each Al flight only
gets 25%.
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Decision Window Probability a
given flight is
selected
Al 0.25
A2 0.50
Al 0.25
Probability (Al is chosen)= 0.50
Probability (A2 is chosen)= 0.50
Figure 2-5: Itinerary Choice Is Determined After Airline Choice
IV.3 Example
Range: 1000 miles
Two airlines Al and A2; Preference for Airline Al = Preference for Airline A2
Al offers one non-stop.
A2 offers one one-connect flight.
Decision Window - Range = 1000 miles
Al A2 A2
Figure 2-6: Example
In this example, the range is 1000 miles therefore we know from the graph that the Fraction
of Schedule Oriented People (FSOP) is 0.674. Schedule oriented people look first for the
best itinerary quality: consequently, in this case, they will choose the non-stop itinerary
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offered by the airline Al. On the other hand, the Fraction of Airline Oriented People
choose first the preferred airline; since the two airlines are equally preferred in this case and
since the only two itineraries offered fit within one decision window only, the Fraction of
Airline Oriented People is evenly allocated here among the two airlines (0.163 each).
Choose Airline Al Choose Airline A2
Schedule Oriented Passengers 67.4% 67.4%
Airline Oriented Passengers 32.6% 16.3% 16.3%
Total 83.7% 16.3%
Table 2-4: Example Results
There is another way to compute these probabilities. According to the Itinerary Quality
Index table, Al is offering an itinerary that has an Itinerary Quality Index equal to 1 and A2
is offering an itinerary that has an Itinerary Quality Index equal to 2. For a range of 1000
miles, the Airline Service Based Coefficients table gives the following coefficients: 100.00 for
(AI,IQI) and 19.45 for (A2,IQI=2).
Probability (Al is selected) = Coefficient (Al)
Coefficient (Al) + Coefficient (A2)
Probability (Al is selected) = 100.00
100.00 + 19.45
Probability (Al is selected) = 83.7%
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V Overview of the Decision Window Model
In figure 2-7, we present how the different blocks fit together. Using demand distribution
data and schedule quality factors, the schedule is challenged by the passengers' choice criteria
and then evaluated to finally determine which itinerary passengers are willing to fly.
Day-of-Week
Demand
Step 1: Time-of-Day
Demand
Schedule Tolerance
and Delta-T
Step 2: Schedule Tolerance
and Delta-T
Path Quality
Airline Image
Weights
Airline Image
Ratings
Decision Orientation
Deternine Decision Window
Position and Sizing
Detemiine Itineraries
within Window
Develop Service Based Evaluate Itineraries
Airline Coefficients within Window
Make First Choice
Itinerary Preference
Figure 2-7: Overview of the Decision Window Model
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VI Features and Limitations of the Decision
Window Model
VI.1 Total Market Demand Is Fixed
Like the Frequency Share - Market Share Models, one underlying assumption in the
Decision Window Model is that the total demand for every single market is fixed beforehand
no matter how high the total aggregated frequency over all the airlines offering service is.
This assumption is consistent with the notion of frequency saturation where, at some point,
increasing service frequency satisfies the same travelers that were satisfied with another
itinerary. As a matter of fact, if the added itinerary falls only within time windows for which
some itineraries are already available, the increase in frequency won't result in any increase in
the number of passengers captured.
VI.2 Fares
Like the Frequency Share - Market Share Models, the Decision Window Model doesn't take
into account the impact of fares on travelers when they consider itineraries. For some
passengers, there is a trade-off between fare and itinerary quality: for example, one may be
willing to fly a connecting itinerary to get a fare $100 cheaper. The Decision Window Model
is however assuming that frequency and itinerary quality are the only determining factors.
VI.3 Itineraries Quality
Short itineraries such as nonstop and direct itineraries are good. Itineraries with long travel
time are less likely to fit within the traveler's decision window. Itineraries with a low
Itinerary Quality Index are less likely to be the first choice preference of a traveler.
VI.4 Range of Trip
The Decision Window Model takes into account the range of a trip when allocating demand
among the airlines that are offering service on a particular market because range determines
48
the importance of different key factors. Indeed, decision orientation (schedule vs. airline)
and thus the results of the trade-off between airline image and itinerary quality depend on
the range of the trip. The longer the range, the more important airline service quality and
passenger environment are. At longer range, a difference in itinerary quality is less
important. Furthermore, the size and the position of the individual decision windows are
closely related to the range of the trip through Delta-T (travel time and time zone difference
if any) and thus through time-of-day demand distribution, which is a function of Delta-T.
VI.5 Timing and Time-of-Day Demand Distribution
Contrary to the Frequency Share - Market Share Models, the Decision Window Model does
take into account that the demand for travel depends on time-of-day.
Let's come back to our previous example with the FS-MS model: when traveling from BOS
to SFO, more people want to depart at 12:30pm rather than at 11pm. If two airlines Al and
A2 are competing in the BOS-SFO market and if Al is offering two itineraries, one leaving
at 10:30pm and one leaving at 11pm, while A2 is offering only one itinerary that leaves at
12:30pm, a Frequency Share - Market Share Model would say that Al captures two thirds of
the market because it doesn't take into account time-of-day demand distribution. On the
other hand, the Decision Window Model is based on the consideration that timing also
determines the market share and thus allocates 95.4% of the demand to airline A2.
Consequently, timing is a crucial parameter when designing a schedule with the purpose of
maximizing the number of passengers captured.
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Figure 2-8: Time-of-Day Demand Distribution and the DWM
VI.6 Frequency
VI.6.1 Higher Frequency Is Good
The Decision Window concept reinforces another key belief about the characteristics of
airline markets. High frequency, i.e. a large number of itineraries at various times during the
day, increases the likelihood that each traveler will find at least one itinerary within his
Decision Window. Consequently, when an airline increases the frequency of its service on a
given market, this should result in an increase in the number of passengers captured in this
market.
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VI.6.2 Frequency Saturation
An example of what is referred to as frequency saturation is illustrated in figure 2-9. In the
figure, I1, 12 and 13 are already offered by the airline; itinerary 14 is added and therefore
service frequency is increased. However, 14 falls only within one decision window DW2 that
already contains itineraries 12 and 13. Given the definitions and the assumptions used as a
basis for the Decision Window Model, the above increase in frequency doesn't improve the
service offered to the passengers because it doesn't increase the likelihood that each traveler
will find at least one itinerary within the decision window. Consequently, adding 14 to the
schedule doesn't result in any additional captured passenger for the airline.
DW1
- J
I -
II j I
I. I
I, i I
I; I
DW2
'-D--------------W-3----
D.W3
Figure 2-9: Frequency Saturation
The Frequency Share - Market Share models are based on the assumption that if an airline
increases its service frequency, it will, as a result, capture more passengers: the market share
captured by an airline is a strictly increasing function of the frequency share of this airline in
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a competitive environment, i.e. when several airlines are competing within a single market.
Therefore, in the previous example, when the itinerary 14 is added at a time where people are
looking for travel options, the airline should see a strictly non-negative effect on its market
share according to the Frequency Share - Market Share models.
The reason why the Frequency Share - Market Share models and the Decision Window
Model have diverging results is that Frequency Share - Market Share models don't take
timing into consideration whereas the Decision Window Model does. The Decision
Window Model is acknowledging the difference between adding a non-stop itinerary at 8am
versus adding a non-stop itinerary at 8pm in a market where the only itinerary already
offered is at 7:50pm.
VI.7 Conclusion
While still acknowledging that frequency and itinerary quality are two key factors for airlines
aiming at attracting market share, the Decision Window Model goes beyond the Frequency
Share - Market Share Models by also recognizing the importance of the range of the trips
and of the timing of the itineraries. However, the Decision Window Model still does not
provide a way to simulate the importance of fares in the market share evaluation process.
A model integrating the Decision Window Model into airline schedule planning would thus
add a new dimension to the schedule design for an airline faced with trying to attract as
many passengers to its itineraries as possible. Indeed, frequency, itinerary quality, and
itinerary timing (departure and arrival time) would thus be the three key parameters that
could be used to create competitive advantage.
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Chapter 3
MIT Airline Scheduling Module (ASM)
I Methodology and Objectives
The ASM presented in this thesis is an automated tool that optimizes airline schedule design
in a competitive environment. In other words, this tool provides a feasible schedule and
maximizes the profit of a given airline using an incremental and recursive process, which
allows to capture the changes in the total demand distribution among the competitors that
any schedule decision by any airline inevitably would induce.
The purpose of the ASM is to relate within a single simulation module different factors that
are determining both for the decision making process of the airline and for the decision
making process of the potential travelers. As a matter of fact, an individual traveler who is
deciding between competing itineraries bases his or her decision on several factors. Some of
these factors can be directly referred to as temporal: departure time and flying time.
Itinerary quality is also a decisive factor that may sometimes be translated into a time factor
since non-stop flights are typically shorter than connecting flights; itinerary may also be
differentiated using quality indexes that discriminate connecting flights from non-stop
flights. Frequency is another time related critical factor since higher frequency brings a
competitive advantage as long as the market is not saturated. Another type of factor is
monetary: fares may have a determining role in the choice of the traveler who may trade-off
timing considerations and fare.
That being said, the airline's objective is to design a schedule that will generate the highest
profit possible. The airline designs its schedule under fleet availability constraint or more
generally speaking under cost constraint. Although profit is computed as the difference
between revenues and costs, maximizing profit is more complex than simply maximizing
revenues and minimizing costs. Indeed, revenues and costs are highly interrelated: for
example, the market share that is captured by the airline depends directly on the number of
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itineraries offered by the airline and consequently depends on the money spent by the airline
to fly those itineraries.
To achieve the objectives of the ASM, we build upon the Extended Schedule Design and Fleet
Assignment Model (ESD-FAM) by Lohatepanont and Barnhart (2002) and thus bring the
integration of the airline scheduling process a step further by coupling it with the Decision
Window Model (DWM). Indeed, in the solution algorithm of ESD-FAM, we introduce a
mechanism to represent the interaction between schedule quality (frequency of service, time-
of-day distribution of departure times, travel time) and total unconstrained demand (market
share) of the airline in market m by using the DWM.
II Assumptions
Since the ASM is based on the ESD-FAM and the DWM, we are making the same
assumptions that have been previously listed in Chapter 2 about the ESD-FAM and the
DWM.
It is thus assumed that the schedule is daily, which means that the same set of flights is flown
everyday, and uses an incremental approach to schedule design.
It is also important to remember that, when an airline is designing its schedule for the next
time period, it is assumed that its competitors are not making any change in their own
schedule.
Finally, it is assumed that the effect of schedule changes on demand is limited to the total
demand distribution among competitors while the total market demand remains constant.
In other words, the addition of new flight legs to the schedule of an airline is not going to
stimulate the demand and generate new passengers who did not want to travel before; the
only effect is a capture effect from which the airline offering an increased level of service will
benefit.
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III Solution Approach
111.1 Feedback Loop
111.1.1 Initialization
The ASM combines the ESD-FAM and the DWM to represent the decision making process
of the airlines with respect to the schedules that they fly. It is based on an iterative process;
therefore, the first step for solving the ASM is to initialize the feedback loop.
Given:
- The total market size for each O&D market, and
= The schedules offered by all the competing airlines,
the total unconstrained demands for each O&D market (airline's market share) are
computed and allocated among the competing airlines using the DWM.
Given all the above and:
" The aircraft available to the airline in the future (possible scenarios: acquisition,
retirement, no change), and
= The fares charged by all the competing airlines,
a list of candidate flights to be deleted from the schedule and a list of candidate flights to be
newly scheduled with the corresponding fares have to be generated by the airline that is
using the ASM in order to design its schedule for the next time period.
111.1.2 Set of Optional Flights
The set of optional flights refers to the set of all the flights that are candidates to deletion or
addition. This set is the key input to the ASM. Indeed, the base schedule that is fed into the
ASM includes both the set of mandatory flights and the set of optional flights. To establish
the set of optional flights, the following questions have to be answered:
" What are the relevant markets and the departure times that the airline does/does not
serve?
" How can one select candidate flights to be potentially removed from/added to the
schedule?
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This set has to be pre-selected based on time-of-day passenger loads and fares data, i.e.
based on profitability. The pre-selection of candidates can be carried out pursuing the
following three steps:
1" Step: Establish set of potential candidates to be added
After sorting O&D markets by total unconstrained demand and expected total revenue, we
determine the O&D markets for which the total supply (i.e. considering all the competing
airlines) does not fully satisfy the demand either because the total frequency of service is
insufficient or because the time-of-day distribution of departure times does not cover the full
range of the demand. Using the DWM, we then determine which are the relevant departure
times that the airline, which is designing its schedule using the ASM, does not currently serve
and that may be worth adding in the next time period. We assume that the fares for these
new flight legs would be equal to the current fares for each O&D market.
2 "d Step: Compute profit per flight leg
The profit on a flight leg basis is the difference between the operating costs incurred by
flying the leg and the revenue generated by the passenger flown on the leg. Using passenger
loads per flight leg and pro-rated fares, we compute the pro-rated revenue per flight leg for
the current schedule. We also estimate the expected profit per flight leg for the potential
candidates determined in the first step.
3 rd Step: Greedy route creating algorithm
Given the set of flight legs currently flown and the set of potential candidates to add, the
objective now is to construct routes that can be flown by a single aircraft on a daily route
acknowledging that there is a trade-off between costs and revenue generated when operating
that aircraft. Because the airline aims to maximize the utilization of an aircraft and thus
profit from this asset, the idea is to determine which sequence of flight legs corresponds to
the best, i.e. most profitable, route for every available aircraft.
The greedy route-creating algorithm can be described as follows:
1. Select and start in the morning with the "best" (most profitable) flight leg and then
create "NI" routes using this flight leg and the best combination of flights that can
be flown by one aircraft on a daily route.
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2. Select and start in the morning with the second best flight and then create "N2"
routes using this flight leg and the best combination of flights that can be flown by
one aircraft on a daily route.
3. ...
The candidates for addition should then be the flight legs that have been incorporated into
the highly profitable routes generated by the route-creating algorithm and the candidates for
deletion should be the flight legs that have been incorporated into the least profitable routes
generated by the route-creating algorithm.
One big limitation of the model is that its tractability decreases when the number of the
decision variables increases: the more optional flights, the less tractable the implementation
of the model and the longer the computational time. Depending on the size of the network
flown by the airline, one may want to limit the search for candidates to a smaller subset of
flight legs, which are the most and the least profitable, and run the route-creating algorithm
with this subset to restrict the number of routes created.
111.2 Solution Algorithm
The ASM takes as input data, such as the flights list and the corresponding fares for each
competing airline and the total market sizes, as well as data specific to the airline that is
designing its future schedule (referred to as airline A), such as the set of optional flights, and
future fleet composition and size.
For each market to be potentially served by the airline A in its base schedule, the total
market shares for each competing airline are computed using the DWM. The DWM is also
used to compute the unconstrained demand at the itinerary level, i.e. the unconstrained
demand that the airline is going to capture on each itinerary serving a given market. Once
those are known, the same process is used to compute the AD/ 's, the demand correction
terms for each itinerary when one of the optional flights is not flown. The demand
correction terms are obtained for as many combinations of flight deletions as possible,
assuming all fight legs (whether mandatory or optional) are initially included in the base
schedule. The final step consists is running the LP solver for the ESD-FAM.
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The output when running the LP solver for ESD-FAM during step (n-1) is the new base
schedule to be used in step n. The new market shares, the new per itinerary demands and
the new demand correction terms AD 's are computed based on the new schedule; and the
LP solver for ISD-FAM is then run another time. When the schedule obtained as output of
step n is identical to its input schedule (i.e. schedule obtained as output of step (n-1)), the
stopping criteria is met.
Convergence depends on the sensitivity of the model to the demand correction terms. If the
model is very sensitive to these terms, it might take many iterations to estimate the
correction terms correctly.
The solution algorithm is summarized in Figure 3-1.
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Figure 3-1: Solution Approach for ASM
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IV Summary
In this chapter, we presented the MIT Airline Scheduling Module (ASM), which combines
the Decision Window Model (DWM) and the Extended Schedule Design and Fleet
Assignment Model (ESD-FAM) within a feedback loop. The ability to solve problems using
the ASM depends on the scale and complexity of these problems, and on the quality of the
data. In the next chapter, we present a case study for a real airline, describe the solution
process from data pre-processing to running the LP solver, discuss the results and finally
illustrate how the airline can use the ASM to reach decisions that would provide them with a
competitive advantage.
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Chapter 4
A Case Study
I Background and Assumptions
The case study presented in this thesis is based on data provided by a real airline whose
competitive environment is limited to only another airline on its domestic network. By
doing so, we take up the challenge of scaling up the ASM to a real airline while limiting the
size of the inputs, decision variables, and constraints of the model. Indeed, the ASM is very
sensitive to the size of the airline network. The larger the network, the higher the number of
itineraries because the higher the number of possible combinations of flight legs, and
consequently the higher the possibilities of change in the schedule. This results in a larger
set of optional flights, a larger set of decision variables, a more complex objective function
and a higher number of constraints. Essentially, the larger the network, the less tractable the
implementation of the model and the longer the computational time.
1.1 System Map
The geographical network, i.e. the set of destinations served by the airline, consists of five
airports. Only two airports (Al and A3) are connected to all the other airports with direct
service thus playing the role of hubs. Airport Al is the only international gateway, which
means that the only flight legs that may carry domestic as well as international passengers are
flight legs into Al or out of Al.
Table 4-1 provides the distance between the airports and figure 4-1 illustrates the system
map.
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Distance (Miles)
A1A2 298
AIA3 463
AIA4 657
AlA5 635
A2A1 298
A2A3 189
A2A4 392
A3A1 463
A3A2 189
A3A4 196
A3A5 216
A4A1 657
A4A2 392
A4A3 196
A5A1 635
A5A3 216
Table 4-1: Distances Between Airports
A2
A3
Al
A4
A5
Figure 4-1: System Map
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O&D
1.2 Schedule
The specific details of the paths are presented in table 4-2. As shown in the table, the
schedule consists of 85 nonstop flights and 115 itineraries, from which 28 are one-stop
itineraries and 2 are two-stop itineraries.
Directional O&D From Via To Total
AIA3 Al A3 11
AIA4 Al A4 1
AIA5 Al A5 1
A1A2 Al _ A2 16
A3A1 A3 _ Al 12
A3A4 A3 A4 0
A3A5 A3 A5 2
A3A2 A3 A2 9
A4A1 A4 _ Al 1
A4A3 A4 _ A3 0
A4A2 A4 _ A2 2
ASA1 A5 _ Al 1
A5A3 A5 _ A3 2
A5A2 A5 _ A2 0
A2A1 A2 _ Al 15
A2A3 A2 _ A3 10
A2A4 A2 _ A4 2
A2A5 A2 __ A5 0
Total Number of Eli hts 85
A1A3 Al A2 A3 6
AIA4 Al A2 A4 2
AIA5 Al A2/A3 A5 1
AIA2 Al A3 A2 2
A3A1 A3 A2 Al 4
A3A4 A3 A2 A4 1
A4A1 A4 A2 Al 2
A4A3 A4 A2 A3 1
A4A2 A4 Al A2 1
A5A1 A5 A3 Al 2
A5A2 A5 A3 A2 1
A2A1 A2 A3 Al 1
A2A5 A2 Al A5 1
AIA3 Al A5 A3 1
AIA4 Al A3/A2 A4 1
AJA5 Al A3 A5 1
A3A1 A3 A5 Al 1
A2A5 A2 A3 A5 1
Total Number of Itineraries 115
Table 4-2: Schedule Summary
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1.3 Fleet
The available fleet consists of ten aircraft. Nine of the ten have the same fleet type with a
capacity of 136 seats. The tenth aircraft has a higher capacity of 195 seats and has so far
only been used by the airline for round trip nonstop service between the two hubs Al and
A3. For the sake of simplicity, and because it may only lead to a slight underestimation of
the potential revenue (since some passengers might be spilled unnecessarily), we are assume
that there is one single fleet type with a seat capacity equal to 136.
1.4 Time-Line Flight Network
At the core of the fleet assignment problem is the flight network, which is used to maintain
the balance of the fleet or each fleet if there are two or more. We use the time-line flight
network with node consolidation.
The time-line flight network consists of a set of nodes associated with each station and arcs
that represent flight legs, aircraft on the ground, and overnighting aircraft [Talluri, 1996].
Each node corresponds to an arrival or a departure of a flight. The location and time of a
departure node is the origin airport and the departure time of the flight; the location and
time of an arrival node is the destination airport and the ready time (time at which the
aircraft is ready to take off again and fly the next leg) of the flight. All nodes are sorted
chronologically at each station for each fleet's flight network. There are four types of arcs:
" Flight arc, which start and end nodes in a fleet network denote a flight in the
schedule.
" Maintenance arc, which represents a maintenance opportunity in a maintenance
station.
" Ground arc, which connects the successive nodes in one station.
" Wrap-around arc, which connects the last event in the evening and the first event in
the next morning at one station and thus represents aircraft overnight.
The count time is a time arbitrarily chosen in the flight network to count the number of
aircraft used in the fleet assignment solution.
In this case study, we used node consolidation to decrease the size of the network to 103
nodes, 85 flight arcs, 98 ground arcs, and 5 wrap-around arcs. Node consolidation consists
of grouping nodes to form islands. An island begins with a set of flight legs all flying into
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the station and ends with a set of flight legs all flying out of the station. The two figures
below, 4-2 and 4-3, illustrate the node consolidation process through which the network size
is decreased from ten nodes down to two islands.
Figure 4-2: Time-Line Flight Network
Figure 4-3: Node Consolidation
1.5 Assumption
In this case study, the recapture rates b 's are set to be equal to 0 except for r equal to the
null itinerary in which case b"" is equal to 1 for all itineraries p. The null itinerary is a
fictitious "empty" itinerary with a fare equal to 0. In other words, when an itinerary p is
capacitated, it is assumed that passengers can only be spilled to the null itinerary i.e. that the
revenue is lost.
This assumption is made because the real recapture rates are unknown and because
arbitrarily choosing the above values (0 and 1) leads to a more tractable problem as the
number of decision variables is greatly decreased. However such an assumption is rather
conservative as it may cause an underestimation of revenue while costs are still accurately
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computed. Indeed spilled passengers are spilled when the itinerary is capacitated, which
means that some revenue is lost while the operating costs have still to be borne by the
airline. Moreover, once the results are obtained, we can look at the number of spilled
passengers, the corresponding capacitated itineraries and the set of itineraries serving the
same O&D market but that are not capacitated. A sensitivity analysis can thus be done to
estimate the revenue that could have potentially been recaptured looking at different
scenarios.
II Formulation
11.1 Objective Function
Given the assumptions previously explained in this chapter, we present here the particular
formulation for the Extended Schedule Design and Fleet Assignment Model used for the
case study. Note that: 4q = 1- Zq. The objective function is to minimize the sum of
operating costs, spilled revenue, and changes in revenue due to cancellations.
Min Zcf + fare, -t""" +Jf fareD - Y fareADq .{
ieL peP qeP\ peP,pqJ
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The 1" set of constraints is the set of cover constraints for mandatory flights ensuring that
every mandatory flight is assigned to a fleet type. The 2 nd set of constraints is the set of
cover constraints for optional flights allowing the model to choose whether or not to fly
flight i in the resulting schedule; if flight i is selected, a fleet type has to be assigned to it.
The 3 rd set of constraints ensures the conservation of aircraft flow.
The 4' set of constraints is the set of count constraints ensuring that only available aircraft
are used.
The 5 th set of constraints is the set of capacity constraints ensuring that the number of
passengers on each flight i does not exceed its capacity.
The 6 th set of constraints is the set of demand constraints ensuring that the model does not
spill more passengers than demand for the itinerary.
The 7' and 8 th set of constraints are itinerary status constraints that control the {0,1}
variable, i; , for itinerary q.
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III O&D Passengers' Data Processing
111.1 Available Raw Passengers' Data
Because, we only had limited data, we had to derive some of the data required for the model.
Specifically, we were given:
(a) The set of flight legs (i.e. flight numbers) serving each directional sector for any day
of the week (i.e. Mondays, Tuesdays, Wednesdays, Thursdays, Fridays, Saturdays and
Sundays) during a given month. Further, we were given the exact number of
passengers (loads) traveling on each of the flight legs for any day of the week.
Example:
Sector Airport1-Airport2
Year 2003
Period y
Day 
_
Flight Data 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Grand Total
101 Passengers 63 63
Capacity 76 76
102 Passengers 28 28
.Capacity 76 76
103 Passengers 38 50 52 52 45 237
Capacity 76 76 76 76 76 380
104 Passengers 40 43 49 26 55 213
Capacity 76 76 76 76 76 380
201 Passengers 49 55 44 45 51 74 318
Capacity 76 76 76 76 76 76 456
202 Passengers 67 51 48 44 38 248
Capacity 76 76 76 76 76 380
203 Passengers 40 39 45 58 59 63 304
Capacity 76 76 76 76 76 76 456
204 Passengers 59 52 68 179
Capacity 76 76 76 228
301 Passengers 58 66 36 60 69 70 359
Capacity 76 76 76 76 76 76 456
302 Passengers 60 60
Capacity 76 76
303 Passengers 48 48
Capacity 76 76
304 Passengers 64 47 111
Capacity 76 57 133
Total Passengers 292 304 333 337 385 235 282 2168
Total Capacity 456 456 532 532 532 304 361 3173
Table 4-3: Flight Leg Loads Per Day of the Week
(b) The schedule and the set of itineraries offered for every directional O&D market
served by the airline on a specific date e.g. MM DD, YYYY.
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(c) The exact number of passengers (loads) traveling on each path for the entire month.
Example:
O&D market: AIA3
Path 1: Al-A3; path 2: AI-A2-A3; path 3: Al-A5-A3
True True F Directional Directional One-way
Ori in Destination O&D Sector Passengers
Al A3 Al A3 AIA3 AIA3 25,000
Al A3 Al A2 AIA3 AIA2 1,000
Al A3 A2 A3 A1A3 A2A3 1,000
Al A3 Al A5 AIA3 AlA5 50
Al A3 A5 A3 AlA3 A5A3 50
Table 4-4: Example of Passenger Loads Distribution Among Different Possible Paths
111.2 Data Processing
The approach here is to use the break down in (a) to figure out the number of passengers in
(c) traveling on a given day of the week.
Let's define P, number of passengers on flight leg f e F d serving sector S on day of the
week d:
PD
P d _ f
N
Where:
D e {Mondays, Tuesdays, Wednesdays, Thursdays, Fridays, Saturdays, Sundays}, month m
d e {a Monday, a Tuesday, a Wednesday, a Thursday, a Friday, a Saturday, a Sunday}
N : Number of occurrences for D during month m.
P D: Sum of passengers on flight legf over D in month m.f
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111.2.1 1st Step: Ratio
We calculate Ratio , the percentage of passengers per month who travel on a specific day of
the week in a given month for a given directional sector using the following expression:
Epd
dfF f pd
Ratios =pmpm
feFi~
Where:
S e {A1A2, AIA3, AIA4, A1A5, ... A5A4} = Set of directional sectors
d e {Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, Saturday, Sunday} Set of days of
the week.
J: Set of flight legs serving the directional sector S on day of the week d.
Fsm : Set of flight legs serving the directional sector S during month m.
P: Number of passengers on flight leg f e Fd on day of the week d.
Hence, :P} =1p: Total number of passengers traveling on sector S on day of the week d.
feF
Pi : Number of passengers on flight leg f e F' .
Hence,- Pf = P' : Total number of passengers traveling on sector S during month m.
feFi
Passengers are either international passengers or domestic passengers; therefore:
= DmstPd ± IntlPd, for the directional sector S on day of the week d.
ps = DmstPm + IntlP , for the directional sector S during month m.
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111.2.2 2nd Step: Number of domestic vs. international
passengers on each sector per month
We know the number of passengers on each path per month. Therefore:
= DmstPs': The number of domestic passengers traveling during a month m on a given
directional sector S is equal to the number of passengers who both are traveling during a
month m on this sector S and have a domestic directional O&D market.
- IntlPs'": Subsequently the difference between the total number of passengers and the
number of domestic passengers who are traveling during a month m on a given
directional sector S corresponds to the number of international passengers who are
flying during a month m on this particular directional domestic sector S as part of an
international itinerary.
IntlPsm = Psm - DmstPs'
111.2.3 3rd Step: Number of domestic vs. international
passengers on each sector per day of the week
We assume that Ratiod, which was computed using the total number of passengers (i.e.
domestic and international passengers), is still applicable separately to both the subset of
domestic passengers and the subset of international passengers. Therefore we can scale the
monthly data obtained during the second step down to daily data using Ratio :
" DmstP : The number of domestic passengers traveling on a day of the week d on a
given directional sector S is equal to the product of the number of domestic passengers
traveling during a month m on sector S and Ratiod.
Dmst l= Ratio1 -DmstP'
= IntlPS: The number of international passengers traveling on a day of the week d on a
given directional sector S is equal to the product of the number of international
passengers traveling during a month m on sector S and Ratiod.
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IntlP = Ratiod ntS
111.2.4 4th Step: Number of domestic vs. international
passengers on each flight leg per day of the week
We assume that the ratio of international passengers versus domestic passengers is a
constant on every flight leg. Therefore, for each directional sector S on the day of the week
d, we can compute the number of domestic passengers on each flight leg on each day of the
week using the ratio: Dms. - DmstP'
DmstP + IntlP' P%
* DmstPf : The number of domestic passengers traveling on a day of the week d on a
given flight legf, f e FS, serving the sector S is equal to the product of the number of
Dmstl'
passengers traveling on a day of the week don flight legfby the ratio d
DmStpd DmstlS' dm.f Pd f
S
- IntlpI: The number of international passengers traveling on a day of the week d on a
given flight legf f e Fserving the sector S is equal to the product of the number of
Intlpd
passengers traveling on a day of the week d on flight legfby the ratio d s
Ps
InldInt , PdIntlPf= p .p
S
111.2.5 5th Step: Number of passengers on each itinerary
per day of the week
Given the number of domestic passengers on each flight leg per day of the week and given
the schedule for Wednesdays and the itineraries offered, we can solve an assignment
problem to compute the number of domestic passengers on each of the 115 itineraries for
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Wednesdays, and more particularly for the date MM DD, YYYY (a Wednesday), using the
Excel SOLVER.
There are 41 flights that are used only by 41 distinct nonstop itineraries. For these 41
itineraries, the number of passengers is equal to the load on the corresponding flight leg.
Consequently, there are still 74 unknown loads Dmstfd for the remaining itineraries and we
need 74 independent equations.
111.2.5.1 Solution
The problem to solve is:
Find DmstPj' for all itineraries i flown on a day of the week d, such that:
(1) DmstPf = IDmstI;" , For all flightsf on a day of the week d.
iE<d
(2) DmstP, = ZDmstJd , For all paths p on a day of the week d
d
Pip
111.2.5.2 First Set of Equations
Each flight leg f is used by several itineraries i e on each day of the week d. DmstPf is
known and DmstJd is unknown.
There are 44 independent equations:
DmstP = f DmstPi
111.2.5.3 Second Set of Equations
On the one hand, a path p is associated to a set of sectors S' that are flown for a given
month m. A nonstop path is associated to one sector; a one-stop path is associated to a set
of two sectors, etc.
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For each path p, we know DmstP,', the number of domestic passengers traveling on this
path for a month m. We also know DmstPs', the number of domestic passengers traveling
on each sectors e S" as part of their trip on path p for a month m.
DmstPm
Therefore, for each path p and each sectors e s,"' we can compute the ratio ,
DmstPsm
which is the percentage of domestic passengers on the sector S flying an itinerary of type p.
We assume that, for a given path p, the monthly ratio is representative of the distribution of
passengers among sectors s e S,' in other words that the daily ratio for the day of the week
d between passengers on path p and passengers on sector s e Sm is equal to the monthlyp
ratio:
DmstPd DmstP"
Dmst4PS DmstPs ,
Finally, we assume as an approximation that DmstP, the number of domestic passengers
traveling on each path p for a day of the week d, is equal to the average of the number of
domestic passengers traveling on the day of the week d on each sector s e S'. S," = d is
the number of sectors S using path p for a month m or for a day of the week d. Note that
tiod DmstpdRats = ,. Consequently:
DmstP,'
(DmstP' -Ratios)
DmstP= ses
On the other hand, for a given day of the week d, for each path p, there is a set of
itineraries Id serving that path. The number of (domestic) passengers on path p on day of
the week d is equal to the sum of the passengers traveling on each itinerary i e Id
DmstP = ( DmstI~
ieId
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On Wednesday MM DD, YYYY, there are 32 paths, which correspond to 32 new
independent equations.
Table 4-5: Number of Daily Itineraries Sorted by Type of Path
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Paths Number of Daily Itineraries
A1A3 11
A1A3A2 2
A1A3A2A4 1
A1A3A5 1
AIA4 1
A1A2 16
A1A2A3 6
A1A2A3A5 1
A1A2A4 2
A1A5 1
A1A5A3 1
A3A1 12
A3A2 9
A3A2A1 4
A3A2A4 1
A3A5 2
A3A5A1 1
A4A1 1
A4A1A2 1
A4A2 2
A4A2A1 2
A4A2A3 1
A2A1 15
A2A1A5 1
A2A3 10
A2A3A1 1
A2A3A5 1
A2A4 2
A5A1 1
A5A3 2
A5A3A1 2
A5A3A2 1
IV Costs, Revenue, and Profit Data Processing
IV.1 Flight Operating Costs
The function used to compute operating costs has two components: a fixed cost, which is
represented by the landing and navigation charges, and a variable cost, which is a function of
the block hours flown.
In other words, for each directional sector S, we know:
" Total number of block hours flown during month m
" Number of landings during month m
" Cost per block hour
" Total landing and navigation charges during month m
We can determine:
- hs: Monthly average number of block hour per flight on sector S
" Cs: Cost per block hour on sector S
" is : Monthly average landing and navigation charges per flight on sector S
For each flightf serving directional sector S, we can thus compute the operating cost:
Costf =s+cs 
-hs
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IV.2 Pro-rated Flight Revenue and Profit
IV.2.1 Domestic vs. International Passengers
Ideally, the network we are considering would be closed: all passengers would be so-called
"domestic passengers" and would only fly from one airport included in the network to
another airport included in the network, possibly through a third airport also included in the
network. However, in this case study, the network passenger flow includes both domestic
and international passengers. Consequently, we need to compute the revenue from
international passengers, who are flying flight legf as part of their international itinerary, in
order to compute the actual profit on each flight legf Indeed, if we were computing the
profit for every flight leg only using domestic revenue and total operating costs, we wouldn't
take into account the fact that these operating costs are also incurred while serving
international passengers traveling on a domestic sector.
Because international passengers are given priority over domestic passengers by revenue
management, one approach to deal with international passengers could be to artificially
decrease the seat capacity on domestic flights flown by international passengers. However,
since the Airline Schedule Module is solving the fleet assignment problem at the same time
as it is generating the schedule, we don't know in advance which aircraft is going to fly which
flight leg. We don't even know which flight legs are going to be flown. In this case, we
wouldn't be able to handle international passengers who would like to travel on flight legs
that are not selected by the schedule generator.
We are thus taking an alternative approach, in which the international travelers are added to
the number of passengers on the corresponding domestic itineraries between their
origin/destination and the airport Al (the only international gateway). That is to say, we
treat them as simply "more passengers on those itineraries." We assume that they contribute
the same fare as the other passengers on that itinerary, i.e. we assume that the prorated fare
for international passenger on the domestic part (i.e. the domestic flight leg]) of their trip is
equal to the domestic fare for the nonstop itinerary corresponding to flight legf This is an
optimistic assumption.
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Therefore, let us define:
* DmstP : Modified number of domestic passengers traveling on a day of the week d on
a given flight leg f f e F, serving the sector S to take into account international
passengers on the corresponding domestic itineraries between their origin/destination
and A1 (the only international gateway).
Dmstf = DmstPf + IntlPf, if f serves a sector S involving Al
Dmstf = DmstPf, otherwise
- DmstPid : Modified number of domestic passengers traveling on a day of the week d on
a given itinerary i, i e I d to take into account international passengers on the
corresponding domestic itineraries between their origin/destination and A1 (the only
international gateway). We assume that all the international passengers traveling on
flight leg f on day of the week d are assigned to the only nonstop itinerary i, i e I.
f.
DmstP.d = DmstP d + Intl f, if i is a nonstop itinerary involving Al, i.e. i = {f}
Dmstl< = Dmstl<, otherwise
IV.2.2 Pro-rated Flight Revenue
Each flight leg f e Fd is used by several itineraries i e 15 on a day of the week d. In the
above sections, we have computed DmstPd, modified number of domestic passengers
traveling on a day of the week d on a given itinerary i, i e I5'. Furthermore, we also know
from the airline's data fare, , the average fare paid by passengers traveling on itinerary
i E= Id.
f.
We are using distance pro-rated revenue, given the fact that each flight leg has a fixed
distance in kilometers.
For example, if the itinerary i uses two flight legs fi and J2, then the revenue allocated to
flight legfl due to itinerary i would be:
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length StdRev' = lnh 1  -fare1 DmstPd
length, + length2
And the revenue allocated to flight leg]2 itinerary i would be:
length2Rev2 - length, + length2 -Dmstpd
Consequently, for a given flight legf; f E F , serving the sector S, we can compute the pro-
rated flight revenue generated by domestic passengers by summing the revenue allocated to
flight legf over all the itineraries i, i e Id.
Revenuef= Rev'f
ireIf
Figure 4-4: Pro-Rated Flight Revenue Allocation
For example, for a small network with two hub airports (H and G) and three spoke cities
(Al, A2, and A3) where the passengers can only fly either nonstop or one-stop through one
of the hubs, the revenue allocated to flight leg fA1 is given by:
RevenuefAH = Rev' "AI- + Rev' AG + Rev' A-*A2 + Rev' A1-A3ReeufI  fAIHF fAI-H fAI-H fII
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IV.2.3 Pro-rated Flight Profit
For each flight leg f, we have computed in the previous sections both the flight operating
costs and the prorated flight revenue. Consequently, the prorated flight profit is the
difference between costs and revenue:
Pr ofitf = Revenuef - Costf
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V Results and Interpretation
V.1 Problem and Solver Parameters
Below, we use the ASM to evaluate here the current schedule flown by the airline. In other
words, no flight leg is mandatory and every flight leg is optional. By doing so, we can assess
the performance of the current schedule from a pure by profit-maximizing point of view.
Nevertheless, it's rather common that an airline has to fly some specific routes no matter
how profitable they are for other reasons (political, historical and so forth) but we are
focusing here only on the financial viability of the schedule.
We solve the mixed integer problem (MIP) for the case study using CPLEX on OPL studio.
The table below presents a summary of the runs (with, among other information, solving
time and number of iterations) done for different values of N, the number of aircraft
available, varying from ten to one. There are 418 variables and 10279 constraints. Solving
time, number of nodes and number of iterations reach a peak for N equal to 6.
N=10 N=9 N=8 N=7 N=6 N=5 N=4 N=3 N=2 N=1
Constraints 10279 10279 10279 10279 10279 10279 10279 10279 10279 10279
Variables 418 418 418 418 418 418 418 418 418 418
Solver memory 30099088 30141680 30095068 30141680 30095068 30145700 30145700 30095068 30137660 30095068
Failures 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Choice points 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Solving time 51.18 59.91 105.64 236.62 1360.05 882.76 58.99 116.07 26.04 23.16
Nodes 3772 3962 7870 15923 150249 82676 4318 9710 300 30
Nodes left 24 43 44 45 513 153 3 7 1 0
Iterations 23077 32690 93518 254716 1915806 1166801 47140 115768 3910 608
Best 646648.67 646697.15 647366.02 650086.75 661543.46 682560.03 763930.99 761706.51 820589.69 880801.26
Bound 646584.52 646633.87 647302.06 650023.12 661477.33 682492.54 763910.54 761642.01 820513.95 860447.75
Table 4-6: Solver Parameters for Different Runs
V.2 Aircraft Utilization
Because an airline is always trying to maximize the utilization of its fleet, the ultimate goal is
to offset costs with sufficient revenue so that flights are profitable. The available fleet is
usually a fixed input when the airline is designing its schedule because change in the fleet mix
takes some time. Moreover, there are always some fixed costs associated with the
acquisition or the lease of each aircraft. We are focusing here on the operating costs because
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these costs depend mostly on the decision made by the airline regarding its schedule and its
fleet assignment. Therefore, the ultimate objective is to determine whether or not it would
actually be profitable for the airline to fly less aircraft.
We run the model for different values of N, the number of aircraft available, varying from
ten to one. Table 4-7 summarizes the results: optimal value of the objective function (total
and break down between operating costs, spilled revenue and lost revenue due to
cancellations).
N=10 N=9 N=8 N=7 N=6 N=5 N=4 N=3 N=2 N=1
Objective Function $646,649 $646,697 $647,366 $650,087 $661,543 $682,560 $712,758 $763,931 $820,590 $880,801
Operating Costs $591,636 $591,636 $591,636 $591,636 $519,485 $447,334 $360,753 $274,173 $144,301 $115,441
Spilled Revenue $121,432 $121,478 $113,627 $116,304 $144,441 $207,005 $238,685 $319,411 $448,639 $553,941
Lost Revenue $98,170 $98,170 $99,636 $99,636 $109,892 $115,753 $130,406 $140,662 $153,849 $156,780
Total Lost Revenue $219,602 $219,649 $213,263 $215,940 $254,334 $322,758 $369,090 $460,074 $602,488 $710,721
A £ L .L.
Flown Flights 41 41 41 41 36 31 25 19 10 8
Flown Itineraries 67 67 68 68 40 36 26 19 10 8
Passengers Spilled 1031 1031 964 987 1226 1757 2026 2711 3808 4701
Table 4-7: Optimal Solution for Different Numbers of Aircraft
The results indicate that the number of flights that should be flown is constant for values of
N between 7 and 10, and decreases as the number of aircraft available decreases for values
of N below 7. Interestingly, the detailed data for values of N between 7 and 10 show that,
while both the spilled revenue and the revenue lost due to cancellation fluctuate, the optimal
value of the objective function is nearly constant. The figures 4-5 and 4-6 allow illustrate
what happens. This suggests that seven aircraft may be sufficient to fly the schedule instead
of ten. Therefore, the airline could either retire the three extra aircraft or use the extra
capacity to fly new routes or increase service in currently underserved routes to make more
profit.
68 itineraries are flown when N is equal to seven while only 67 itineraries are flown when N
is equal to ten. This can be easily explained: having more aircraft gives the airline more
flexibility in the fleet assignment. Indeed, with ten aircraft, the airline can afford to have an
aircraft sitting on the ground waiting for a later flight leg that lots of passengers would like to
fly; whereas, with only seven aircraft, the airline may assign its aircraft to earlier less
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profitable flight legs to send the aircraft to another station on time and insure that other later
profitable flights can be flown.
Figure 4-5: Optimal Solution Value vs. Number of Utilized Aircraft
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Figure 4-6: Optimal Set of Decision Variables vs. Number of Utilized Aircraft
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V.3 Frequency Saturation
The optimal solution for this case study indicates that only 41 flight legs out of 85 and only
68 itineraries out of 115 should be flown. Table 4-8 summarizes the results per directional
O&D market. It thus implies that the airline should reduce the frequency of service for
every O&D market it is currently serving. In some cases, it is even recommended that the
O&D market should not be served anymore, which might raise policy issues, especially
regarding access for small markets as it will be discussed in the next chapter.
Table 4-8: Optimal Solution - Frequencies for Each O&D Market
Airlines usually follow a route expansion strategy, and thus predominantly focus on adding
frequencies to previous developed destinations, because they are adhering to the rationale
that such a strategy would be to attract a bigger market share, especially more business class
travelers. The obvious limitation of this strategy is that the higher the frequency, the higher
the operating costs. Consequently, without denying the fact that higher frequency is good,
one of the reasons why the optimal solution implies an overall reduction in frequency of
service is certainly that, beyond a certain frequency, the revenue generated when adding
frequency does not offset the extra operating costs. This tradeoff is indeed embedded in the
ASM thanks to the objective function of the ESD-FAM. Note that this reasoning is
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Directional O&D Market Cancelled Flown Total
A1A2 8 10 18
A1A3 5 13 18
A1A4 2 2 4
AlA5 1 2 3
A2A1 7 9 16
A2A3 4 6 10
A2A4 2 0 2
A2A5 1 1 2
A3A1 6 11 17
A3A2 3 6 9
A3A4 0 1 1
A3A5 2 0 2
A4A1 2 1 3
A4A2 2 1 3
A4A3 0 1 1
A5A1 1 2 3
A5A2 0 1 1
A5A3 2 0 2
Total 48 67 115
particularly appealing in the case of the small markets (e.g. A3A5 and A5A3) where the
optimal solution indicates that the markets should not be served anymore because the
expected revenue is simply too low.
Pushing the reasoning a step further, the overall reduction in frequency of service might also
be explained by the frequency saturation. This concept, which has been introduced in the
ASM through the Decision Window Model, takes into account a further limitation of the
route expansion strategy: the demand for travel is spread across the day and adding
frequency may not be improving the supply if the departure times are concentrated within
only one time window. Consequently, the optimal solution is minimizing overlap in routes
and frequencies by taking the redundant itineraries off the schedule, which results in a
decrease in the frequency of service. This reasoning may be more adapted to the big markets
(e.g. A1A2 and AIA3) whose current frequency of service is very high, even excessive to
some extent.
V.4 International Passengers
In this case study, we treat the international travelers simply as more passengers on the
corresponding domestic itineraries between their origin/destination and the airport A 1 (the
only international gateway). We assume that they contribute the same fare as the other
passengers on that itinerary, i.e. we assume that the prorated fare for international passenger
on the domestic part (i.e. the domestic flight legf) of their trip is equal to the domestic fare
for the nonstop itinerary corresponding to flight leg f This is an optimistic assumption,
which tends to slightly overestimate the expected revenue.
However, this approach does not take into account the fact that international passengers
have different decision windows than domestic passengers. Indeed, their travel time is not
limited to the flying time corresponding to the domestic flight leg of their itineraries and it
may even be far longer. If it is correct that some international passengers have a shifted
decision window, then it might make sense to schedule flight legs that were not attractive
when considering the time-of-day domestic demand distribution but that might be attractive
when considering the time-of-day international demand distribution. Therefore, for the
biggest O&D markets, especially AlA2 and AIA3, the decision to decrease frequency may
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need to be revised to accommodate the international passengers willing to travel on the
deleted flight legs.
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Chapter 5
Issues of Access for Small Markets
I Introduction
This chapter supplements the profit maximizing optimization methodology (which has been
developed in chapter 3 and illustrated by a case study in chapter 4) by discussing policy
implications, particularly in the context of access for small markets. Indeed, optimization
methods often lead to extreme schedule decisions such as eliminating service to markets,
often small markets, that are not financially profitable for the airlines. This result is of grave
concern to government policy makers as rural access to markets, goods and services is a
politically charged subject. The issue is therefore to understand what is likely to happen in
small communities if the government doesn't respond in some way and how much subsidy,
if any, would it be necessary to encourage airlines to maintain service in these markets. Our
approach is based on economic policy and cost-benefit analysis and is illustrated in the
context of the country (referred to as country C) and the airline studied in chapter 4.
II Air Transport Policy Framework
11.1 Transportation System
The social, economic and cultural development of a country is typically highly intertwined
with the development of its transportation system. In country C, the evolution of the
transportation system has been characterized not only by the country's remoteness from
many of its trading partners, but also by its relatively low population density. International
air and telecommunication channels have helped overcome the country's isolation, but there
is still a heavy reliance on sea transport for overseas trade. Comprehensive railway and road
networks have been established over difficult terrain and, taking into account the size of the
population, the capital cost has been high. In recent years deregulation has brought major
changes in the transport sector. The sector had been protected by legislation and by being
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entirely government-owned but is now on a more commercial footing. The fundamental
shift away from government owned and operated transport systems to a more market based,
private sector approach to the delivery of transport services represents a major policy change
and had fundamental and far-reaching impacts on the national transport system, and
especially in the national air transport system [National Ministry of Transport].
11.2 Air Transportation
Country C is one of the most aviation-oriented nations in the world: there is one pilot for
every 430 people and one aircraft for every 1,170 people. During the 1998/99 years the
airlines carried more than 4.7 million passengers on domestic services and 2.7 million arrived
on international air carriers.
As in most countries, the airline industry in country C is characterized by high capital costs
(e.g. for aircraft and ground support equipment), combined with relatively inflexible
operating costs (labor, fuel, insurance, and infrastructure). In most areas of operating costs
carriers are price takers and have little or no influence over price. This is particularly true for
services such as airports, security and air navigation, which are generally mandated by
regulation and are single sourced or monopoly service providers.
On the revenue or market side, the overall size of the market has continued to grow over the
last ten years. In general, this growth has mirrored the growth in GDP. However, the
airline industry tends to be very cyclical and earnings tend to fluctuate in ranges greater than
the changes in GDP. A major reason for these demand characteristics is that the demand
for air services is primarily derived. Generally speaking, air services are an intermediate
product and not the end product. Therefore, it is greatly influenced by such factors as
changes in the business climate or consumer preferences for leisure activities. The reverse of
this relationship is also true. Changes in the price of air services can have a significant
impact on the viability of other sectors such as tourism and the business convention market.
It is thus very difficult for the airline to save cost. They have to focus on capturing high
revenue and thus they cannot afford serving unprofitable markets as the margin on
profitable markets is limited by the height of the operating costs. Consequently, they tend to
serve only promising markets involving cities where people and businesses are concentrated.
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11.3 Challenges
Deregulation had a positive effect for the airline industry and, more generally, for the
travelers. However, it has created some significant challenges, which must be tackled if the
country wants to continue to enjoy these benefits in the future. Some of the key issues that
have appeared recently are as follows:
" The need to guarantee an environment that fosters competition;
" The need to develop an industry policy that clearly recognizes the need for an
adequate return to investors and shareholders;
" The need to establish policies that ensure that critical common industry
infrastructure such as air navigation, airports and security are efficient, cost effective
and priced compliant with accepted international standards;
= The need to continue to improve and modernize the safety, security, access and
environmental regulatory frameworks in a manner which does not excessively
restrain the industry's growth; and
" The need to ensure that small regional markets receive the best possible service.
In this thesis, we focus the discussion on the last issue.
Il Issues of Access for Small Markets
111.1 Supply and Demand Interactions
The integrated model of air transportation service demand and supply shown in figure 5-1
has been developed to describe intercontinental air passengers' services. However, it still
provides us with a good representation of the economic issues faced by airlines on the
domestic market. "In view of the available transportation services, and their associated
price, frequency and trip convenience, consumers then decide whether or not to purchase
the services. Reasonably, the current and projected states of the economy will have an
impact on consumers' decision, given a specified supply of air transportation services. The
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level of aggregate demand is in turn considered by air carriers in planning their future
services." [Fan, 1999]
Air Service Agreement
Economy
Demand for * Supply of Services by
Transportation Services ----------------------- Carriers
Prices
Frequency
Route Convenience
Service
Directly determines As an input to decision-making of
Figure 5-1: Integrated Model for Air Transportation Service Demand and Supply [Fan, 1999]
In the previous chapters of this thesis, we clearly adopted a profit-maximizing approach in
accordance to the above economic model. In this chapter, the focus shifts from the
interaction of air carriers and consumers back to the role of the government as a policy
decision maker, especially regarding issues of access to small regional markets.
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111.2 Small Regional Markets
Country Cs geography presents a huge challenge: How can one make sure that people
living in smaller centers and rural areas have access to essential air services? The purely
economic approach of market defined services does not always lead to an acceptable
solution from a policy point of view (because it is not in the best interest in the long term
from a social and political standpoint) when the market may be too small to generate
sufficient revenues to offset the cost of the service. Moreover, the issue is made more
complex because air transport services are related to a variety of other requirements such as
public safety and local economic development. Given these issues, a clear framework to
guide policy makers is crucial.
111.3 Role of the Government
There are several ways in which the government might intervene in situations such as this.
Although some argue that the government should not intervene at all and that one should let
the market rule, other argue that, to the contrary, the government should interfere by setting
mandatory standards and rules. Finally, refusing these two extremes, some argue that the
government should develop market-based regulation. In this case, one possible framework
would incorporate the following principles:
- Market forces should be the primary determining factors of air service.
" Cautious, cost-efficient and non-market distorting support of critical common
infrastructure is a legitimate role for governments in small regional markets.
" Governments are responsible for public safety and should continue to provide
the support necessary to deliver this function.
" Other objectives such as regional development should be managed outside this
framework.
" Any intervention must be subject to careful consultation with all the
stakeholders.
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IV Regions Community Profile
In chapter 4, we presented a case study involving five airports A1, A2, A3, A4 and A5 that
represent the set of airports to which the airline is offering domestic service. To apply this
framework it is first necessary to understand the social, economic and political interests at
stake and evaluate the implications of comprehensive air service. Relevant data about the
regions associated with each airport are presented below. Note that airports A4 and A5 are
actually serving the same region.
IV. Population
Population (at the 2001 Census) Change Since 1996
Country 3,737,277 118,974
Region Al 1,158,891 90,234 +8.4%
Region A2 423,765 9,717 +2.3%
Region A3 481,431 13,389 +2.9%
Region A4 & A5 181,539 -3,543 -1.9%
Table 5-1: Population at the 2001 Census
IV.2 Business
Business Locations in 2002
(Geographic units)
Country 309,749
Region Al 108,789 35.12%
Region A2 36,994 11.94%
Region A3 37,123 11.98%
Region A4 & A5 14,228 4.59%
Table 5-2: Business Locations in 2002
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A geographic unit used in the context of business surveys refers to a separate operating unit
engaged in one, or predominately one, kind of economic activity from a single physical
location or base.
IV.3 Income
Median Income (at the 2001 Census)
Country
Region Al
Region A2
Region A3
Region A4 & A5
$18,500
$21,100
$22,400
$17,600
$15,700
Table 5-3: Median Income at the 2001 Census
IV.4 Average Annual Household Spending
Transportation Food Housing HousingOperation
Country $7,358 $7,004 $10,159 $5,472
Region Al $8,066 $7,957 $13,566 $5,825
Region A2 $8,570 $7,375 $10,234 $6,057
Region A3 $6,188 $6,242 $8,543 $4,942
Region A4 & A5 $5,916 $6,309 $8,573 $5,011
Table 5-4: Average Annual Household Spending at the 2001 Census
IV.5 Implications
Given the data presented in tables 5-1 and 5-2, we expect high level of traffic between region
A1 and regions A2 and A3 but low level of traffic between regions A4 and A5 and any of
other regions. Indeed, previous work has shown that there are huge travel needs from/to
wherever people and businesses are concentrated. The data presented in tables 5-3 and 5-4
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further support the expectation of high level of traffic between region Al and region A2.
Indeed, people in these two regions are wealthier and spend more than the average
population; such a situation creates a need for mobility and exchanges between the two
regions.
In other words, the above tables clearly demonstrate the economic and social differences
among the different regions served by the airline. Region Al is the most dynamic,
populated, growing and wealthy region of all, followed closely by region A2. Region A3
comes then and region A4&A5 is the least attractive one.
V Alternatives
V.1 Alternative Mode of Transportation
Rail transportation is the alternative mode of transportation that represents the biggest
competition to air transportation within country C. The national railway company is owned
by a private consortium. The consortium plays a key role in the increasingly competitive
transport market of the country, operating rail, trucking and shipping services throughout its
national network. In the 1998/99 financial year 12.9 million tons of freight was carried.
Urban commuter services in A 1 and A2 provide more than 10 million passenger trips a year.
One possible recommendation would be that the Government support the development of
the rail in markets neglected by the air service. This is a reasonable option in markets like
A 1A2 and A3A4 for which the cities are relatively close to one another.
V.2 Essential Air Service
Under a so-called essential air service program (in reference to the program administered by
the U.S. Department of Transportation) the government would determine the minimum
level of service required at each eligible community by specifying a hub through which the
community is linked to the national network, a minimum number of round trips and
available seats that must be provided to that hub, certain characteristics of the aircraft to be
used, and the maximum permissible number of intermediate stops to the hub.
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The concentrated structure of the air transportation industry in country C makes it difficult
to regulate in terms of an essential air service program. The responsibility of complying with
essential services regulations presently lies with the airlines offering domestic service. Only
two airlines comprise the entire air travel market. The concentration of compliance costs on
these airlines and the diffuse benefits to the scattered rural communities imply a classic
Olsonian collective action problem [Olson, 1982]. Airlines have fairly homogeneous
interests and can more easily mobilize opposition to essential services while the general
public's interest is underrepresented.
A recommendation would be for the government to offer subsidies for a number of air
routes if they meet certain criteria. This practice may be a viable means of ensuring adequate
air services to remote and sparse areas of population. The list of criteria has to be carefully
establish by the government so at to be in accordance with the particular social, economic
and political interests of the country. The extent to which routes should be subsidized
depends on the amount that would be necessary for the airline to counterbalance the loss in
profit if it was to offer service to these non-profitable routes. It also should be based on a
careful estimation of the benefits associated to the provision of air transportation service to
small regional markets.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Research Directions
I Summary
In this thesis, we bring the integration of the airline scheduling process a step further by
building upon (coupling) the Extended Schedule Design and Fleet Assignment Model (ESD-
FAM) by Lohatepanont and Barnhart (2002) and the Decision Window Model (DWM) to
create the Airline Scheduling Module (ASM), an automated tool that optimizes airline
schedule design in a competitive environment. We applied the ASM to the schedule of a real
airline in the case study in chapter 4. The results emphasize the importance of an adequate
use of resources, the interactions between frequency and market shares, and the existence of
frequency saturation. However, the purely economic approach of market defined services
does not always lead to an acceptable solution from a policy point of view when the market
may be too small to generate sufficient revenues to offset the cost of the service. Therefore,
in the last chapter, we discuss different policy recommendations (such as supporting of an
alternative mode of transportation and developing an essential air service program) that
might be put in place to address the issue of access for small markets.
II Future Work
In this thesis, we conduct computational experiments using one set of data. Additional
computational experimentation should be performed to evaluate further the potential
benefits of the integrated approach of the Airline Scheduling Module.
The model in this thesis does not consider simultaneous changes of schedule by competing
airlines. The ASM is used so far to determine the changes in the schedule of only one airline
that is aware of the competitive environment. In other words, the model takes into account
the changes in the allocation of the total demand within all the competing airlines assuming
that only one airline is able to modify its schedule for the next time period. One possible
extension is to use the ASM within a game theoretic simulation to study the non-cooperative
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gaming behaviors of all the airlines offering service. A proposed method would consist of
running simultaneously the ASM for competing airlines so as to simulate the competitive
responses of each airline competitor seeking to maximize profit. A model of airline hub
competition may be developed and calibrated using historical data.
The model in this thesis does not explicitly incorporate the fare effects. However, the ASM
is sensitive to fare, especially the fares of the optional flights that are candidate to be added
to the network. Additional research extension is to study the sensitivity to fare of the results
obtained with the ASM model. Eventually the model could be modified to incorporate fare
effects; given that it is possible to calibrate the model using historical data.
Another future research direction would be to use the MIT Extensible Air Network
Simulation (MEANS) to calibrate the whole NAS Strategic Simulator. MEANS was initially
designed to support the exploration, development and evaluation of Air Traffic Management
(ATM) concepts for Collaborative Decision-Making (CDM), in particular, and for Traffic
Flow Management (TFM) in general. Since then, the capabilities of MEANS have been
expanded to allow for the evaluation of airline scheduling concepts, and the reliability and
robustness of airline schedules. The architecture of MEANS emphasizes flexibility,
modularity, and the ability to easily simulate uncertainty and other probabilistic phenomena.
MEANS is an event-based simulation. It tracks aircraft through the entire nation and the
emphasis is placed on ground-based effects. Arrival and departure rates at airports are
constrained, which produces delays that propagate throughout the system. The simulation
also tracks every passenger in the NAS.
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